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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In ·the :Jlatter of: 
GUS P. LEXE'S, RALPH )[. GAR-
KER, PETER JOHN KANON and 
THO:JIAS L. ANDERSON, Em-
ployees of the American Smelting & 
Refining Company, 
Petitioners, 
and 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, Department of Employ-
menlt Security and Al\lERICAN 
S:JIELTING & REFINING COM-
PANY, 
Defendants. 1 
I 
Case No. 7 623 
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be designated as follows: petitioners 
and def.endants. 
All italics •are ours. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Petitioners, Gus P. Lexes, Ralph M. Garner, Peter 
John Kanon and Thomas L. Anderson, were employees 
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2 
of lthe· American Smel'ting & Refining Company, working 
at their Garfield Utah smelter. All of the· petitioners 
' ' 
were unemployed from the 28th day of June, 1950, to and 
including the, 8th day of July, 1950. The unemployment 
resulted from a closing of the A. S. & R. Company 
Smelter at Garfield on June 28th when the 7 :45 A. M. 
shift of employees was una:ble to enter the smelter be-
cause there was a.t the gates to the smelter a picket line 
df the Switchmen's Union of North America. 
The Swittchmen's Union is affiliated with the Ameri-
can Federation of Labor. All of the petitioners are 
members of the Garfield Smelter Local Union No. 4347 
of the United 1Steel Workers of Amerioo, affiliated with 
the C.I.O. 
Petitioner Kanon reported for work on the morning 
of the 28th of June aJt approximately 7 :30. When he ar-
rived at tlre east gate, there was a lot of commotion, 
automobiles ·parked on the highway, busses lined up 
along the highway in front of the gate. Traffic was 
stopped by a picke1t line aJt 'the east gate. There was a 
large group of men at the gate. Mr. Kanon was quite 
sure that if he had ~attempted to cross through the picket 
line he would have been s~opped. He did rrot attempt to 
cross the picket line (R. 52). When pressed for an esti-
mate of the number of persons. at the east gate Mr. 
Kanon stated that in his opinion there were a couple of 
hundred. .A!t that time Mr. Kanon did not se·e· any sheriff 
or other law enforcement personnel at the gate (R. 53). 
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Petitioner Garner belonged to that group of employ-
ees who did not report for work on the 7 :45 shift. H·e 
was on a ten-day leave ·because of illness on the 28th of 
June. He was to report back for duty on the 1st of July. 
On the 30th of June he called the Garfield plant and was 
inforn1ed by ~Ir. Romney, the Employment Director, 
that there was no work ·availa.b1e for him. 
Petitroner Lexes likewise was not to report for work 
on the 28th of June and heard an announcement over the 
radio at approximately 11 :00 Wednesday night that the 
picket line was at the gate and employees were not going 
through it (R. 57, 58). 
There was no dispute about the basic facts of the 
picket line and the orders for the men not to report for 
work after the 28th of June. When it became known 'i:hat 
the employees of the A. S. & R. plant at Garfield could 
not go through the switchmen's picket line the company 
and union offiCials agreed that in order to save incon-
venience an announcement should be made over the r·adio 
that the plant was closed down. Such announcements 
were periodically 'broadcast by local radio stations in 
their news broadcasts (R. 36). 
For a long time prior to the 28th of June the switch-
ing opel'lations at the A. S. & R. plant at Garfield had 
been carried on by members of the Switchmen's Union 
·of North America. Several days prior to the 28th that 
Union struck against The Denver and Rio Grande West-
ern Railroad Company. The swi1tchmen running the 
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switching equipment at A. S. & R., who were members of 
the .Switchmen's Union, struck. None of the members of 
the Switchmen's Union were emp~oyees of A. S. & R. 
They were all employed by The Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad ComP'any. 
It was stipulated that there was no labor dispute 
between the A. S. & R. and any of its employees. After 
the switchmen went out on strike the members of the 
Steel Wo·rkers' Union took over the switchmen's switch-
ing jobs at A. S. & R. 's plant at Garfield. 
About the 23rd of June the union leadership in-
formed the management that if a picket line was formed 
a:t the plant that its members would not pass through the 
picket line (R. 17). The Oompany Manager, Mr. Rouil-
lard, on tile morning of the 28th informed Mr. Keith, the 
Chairman of the Union, that the picket line would be 
enjoined ~and he requested that the union employees of 
the plant remain around f.or several hours so that this 
could be accomplished. The management ·did not have the 
piekets enjoined o:r remo-ved from their picketing nf the 
gates to the smelter (R. 35). Mr. Rouillard was very 
sure that the :pii.cke't line was an illegal picket line and 
would he removed wrthin :at least a day (R. 16). 
Mr. Keith and Mr. Matthews, members. of the Ex-
ecutive Board of the Union, were of the opinion that had 
their membership attempted to cross the swit~h­
men's picket line there would hav.e he·en disturbances and 
violence and probably a "nice'' riot (R. 21). 
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Possible violence was only one of the deterring fac-
tors that prevented the employees of A. S. & R. from 
going through the picket line. Union members g-enerally 
take an oath that they will not violate picket lines. Th~s 
oath is seriously and universally accepted by members 
of organized labor ( R. 21). 'The A. S. & R. plant was 
a union plant and all of the day-pay workers were mem-
bers of the Steel Workers' Union. The town of Garfield, 
in which many of the employees reside, provides the 
social atmosphere in which the men must live. The vio-
lation of a picket line by a union member places a stigma 
on the vio1a:tor. He becomes 'known as a "rat" or a 
"scab" or a person who will not abide by his o~ath. Mr. 
Keith testified that it was regarded as •an unforgivea:ble 
thing to do in the ranks of labor (R·. 22). 
Clarence Palmer, Executive Secretary ·of the Utah 
Industrial Union Council, testified that every union man 
on joining a union pledges that he will, in effect, respect 
picket lines ~and work for the b~tterment of ·all laboring 
men; that ·a union man who crossed a picket line wm.ud 
be termed ·a ''scab,'' a man devoid of honor, one that 
could not be trusted and was not acceptable for the so-
ciety of o\ther union men. Mr. Palmer relaJted how the 
crossing of picket lines often leads to violence and acts 
of violen0e. The union members on strike have a great 
deal at stake. They ~are emo1tionally affected by wO'rkmen 
crossing their pickett line. 
Mr. Mitthews, one of the Executive Board of the 
Garfield Local, stated that when he arrived at the picket 
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line at the east gate the pickets were theTe; that they, 
in protecting 'their jobs, would have' stopped him in one 
way or another had he tried to cro:ss through the picket 
line. All the men of the 7 :45 A.l\L shift were there at the 
gate. He further testified that Garfield was a union com-
muniy, union minded, and anyone who would attempt to 
cross a picket line would he termed a ''scab'' and people 
wouldn't take to such a person. He would be more or less 
ostracized (R. 45). Mr. Matthews further testified thaJt 
even though the pickets were outnumbered they were 
always ready to g~t reinforcements and they would use 
violence even though outnumbered, resul1ting in a brawl 
(R. 50). 
The Appeals Referee found the facts substantially 
as set forth in the Statement of F 1acts and that the closing 
of the plant was made necess,ary hy the refusal orf the 
plant employees ·to pass the picket line. They further 
found in number 7 of their Findings that if the workern 
involved had attempted to cross the picket line to go to 
work they would have been in dispute with their fellow 
workers 1and the union. They would have been considered 
as "scabs" and their position in the community would 
have become socially undesirable. 
The Appeals Referee then .concluded thaJt the claim-
ants were not available for work for the weeks ending 
July 1, 1950, and July 8, 1950, and as a consequence were 
not qualified for unemployment com•p(msation. The 
Board of Review of the Industrial Oommission. concluded 
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that none of .the con1pany workers was available for work 
from Jlme 28th through July 7th, thus affirming the deci-
sion of the ~-\ppeals Referee. From the dedsion ·of the 
Board of Review petitioners prosecute this appeal to the 
Supreme Court. 
The Industrial Commi,ssion Claims Supervisor, Far-
raid Christensen, in denying petitioners' application f;or 
unemployment compensation stated as follows: 
'·You were unemployed because in accordance 
'vith your union prin.ciples you did not choose to 
cross the picket line which had been established by 
the Switchmen's Uni·on. This choice is one which 
members of organized labor are frequently called 
upon to make and in the eyes of the Utah act, this 
kind of choice has never been deemed involuntary. 
You are, therefore, ineligible to receive benefits 
from J nne 25 through July 8, 1950. '' 
At the hearing before the Appeals Referee the evi-
dence which petitioners presented was directed toward 
the proposition of showing that ~i;heir conduct was no1t 
voluntary but that they were involuntarily, and with good 
cause, off their johs on the days in which they seek un-
employment compensation. As a eonsequence, the record 
before the Courl is not primarily directed toward illu-
minating the availability of the petitioners for employ-
ment. There has been a shift of the Department of Em-
ployment Security's positi'on from the supervisors early 
ground to the s~tated ground in the· Department's deei-
swn. 
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P·eJtitioners feel that the question of their availability 
f.or work is -adequately demonstrated by the evidence pre-
sented to the ..AJppeals Referee and tram.scrihed for this 
Court. The statutes under which the Department of 
Employment Security ooted •are Section 42-2a-4, Utah 
Code Awnota.ted 1943, as ·amend,ed Laws of 1949, :the 
salient portions of wMch re•ad as follows : 
''An unemployed individual shall be eligible 
to receive benefits with respect to any week only 
if it has been f•ound by the commission that: 
* * :jj: :jj: * 
'' (c) He is able to work and is aV1aila;ble f.nr 
work.'' 
and Section 42-2a-5, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as 
amended Law•s of 1949, which reads as follows: 
''.An individual shall [not] be ineligible for 
benefits or f.or purposes •of establishing a waiting 
period: 
"·(a) For the week in which he has left work 
voluntarily without good oouse, if so found by the 
commission, and for n'ot less than one or more 
than the five next following weeks, as determined 
by the commission according to the circumstanoes 
in each .case, provided that when such individual 
has had no bona fide employment between the 
week in which he volunt1arily left such work with-
out good cause and the week in which he· filed fO'r 
benefits he shall be so disqualified f.or the week 
in which he filed f.or benefits and for rrot less than 
one or more 1than the five next following weeks.'' 
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The exact reas-on for the shift in ·the department's 
position is hard to discover. Petitioners believe that 
there is no material reason for the shift, but for the 
sake of presen'ting this case in all of its ramifications 
they will show not only that they were not voluntarily 
unempl'oyed without good cause bu:t also that they were 
available for work 
STATE~IENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
PETITIONERS DID NOT LEAVE WORK VOLUNTARILY 
WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE. 
POINT II. 
PETITIONERS WERE AT ALL TIMES AVAILABLE FOR 
WORK. 
POIN'T III. 
THE IN ABILITY OF PETITIONERS TO GAIN ACCESS 
TO THEIR PLACE OF WORK WAS ATTRIBUTABLE TO 
THEIR EMPLOYER. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PETITIONERS DID NOT LEAVE WORK VOLUNTARILY 
WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE. 
The s'alient, henefieial and essential benefits of un-
employment compensation sli:atutes have now been estab-
lished 'beyond any possible doubt. The beneficial effects 
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of unionization of employees has als'O ceased to be contro-
verted by any intelligent s·egment of our vopulation. 
Maintenance of unions has been protected by statu:tory 
enactment so that there could be no possible· doubt on this 
matter. Utah Code Anno·tated, 1943, Section 42-2a-5, 
8ubsecti1on (c) as amended £.aws of 1949, contains the 
following provision concerning ineligibility of employees 
for workmen's eompensrution: 
'' ( 2) N otwiths1Janding any othe·r provisi'ons 
of thils act, no wor'k shall he deemed suit;a;ble, and 
benefits shall not be denied under this ~act to any 
otherwise eligible individual for refusing to ac-
cept new work under ·any of the following condi-
tions: (A) if the position offered is vacant due 
dire0tly to a s.trike, lockout or other labor dispute; 
(B) if the wages, hours, or other c;onditions of the 
wo·rk offered are subs.tantially less favorable to 
the individual than those prevailing f.o,r similar 
work in the looolity; (C) if as a condition of being 
employed the individual would be required to j;oin 
a company union or to resign from or refrain from 
joining any bona fide labor organiz,ation. '' 
In his findings 'of fact the Appeals Referee failed to 
make 'any finding as to whether or not the actions of the 
employees in :fiailing to go through the switchmen's 
union picket line wa;s a volun!tary or involuntary 'act on 
their part or was wilth 'or without good cause. His only 
finding lo;oking to such question was Finding of Fact 
No. 7, which reads ~as follows (R. 95) : 
";That if the workers involved in this matter 
had a:ttempted to cross 1the picket line to go to 
wor'k, they wou.l:d have been in disrepute with their 
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fellow workers ·and with their un.ion. They would 
hav-e been considered as 'scabs' and their position 
in the community would have be~oine socially un-
desirable." 
Finding of Fact No. 7 indicates that in 'the opinion of 
the referee the actions of the petitioners were probably 
involuntary. At least his finding will sustain a belief that 
the petitioners had good cause for failing to cross 
through the picket line under the circum1stances sur-
rounding them at the gates of the A .. S. & R. plant •on the 
morning of June 28th. The evidence is undisputed and, 
as a matter of I~aw petitioners submit, shows their con-
duet involuntary and with good cause. 
What is "good cause" has been discussed at great 
length in a very learned ·a:rticle, Lesser, Eligibility and 
Disqualification, 55 Yale L. J. 115, 158. Lesser, after 
discussing a number ;of the positions that administrative 
bodies have taken in interpreting unemployment com-
pensation acts, comes to the conclusion that ''good 
cause'' as used in such acts m-eans only cause that would 
justify a reasonable pers·on in leaving his work. For 
similar conclusions see Unemployment Compensa!tion 
and Labor Disputes, 49 Ya.le L. J. 461, and Schin:dler-
Collective Bargaining ·and Unemployment Insurance 
Legislation, 38 Col. L. Rev. 858. No reasonable interpre-
tation of our ~statute would require an unemployed work-
man to take unreasonable risks either tto his social or 
physical well-being to qualify for unemployment com-
pensation. 
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The proposition to be resolved then simply stated is: 
Did the petitioners •act as reasonable men on the morning 
of June 28th when they did not cross :the switchmen's 
picket line' Having a bearing on their decision are the 
following undisputed facts: 
1. The picket line was in place and appeared in all 
respe~ts re·gular and bona fide. 
2. A 1arge group of union personnel had collected 
in front of the picket line. The drivers on .the busses 
carrying the men into the plant had stopped at the picket 
line. The men ·at 'the gat·e became uneasy and angry when 
they learned of some union personnel in the plant work-
ing. 'They indica;ted that ~a riot might commence unless 
such violation of union rules and regulations was 
stopped. 
3. The community in which petitioners reside i•s a 
thoroughly unionized town in which loyalty to union 
causes is a primary social mainspring. ''Scabs'' are 
there held socially unacceptable and unfit for the asso~­
cia;tion of good union workers. Ostraciza;tion would be a 
me•ans of •showing the disfa¥or into which union men fall 
when 'they are disloyal to the oath whieh they take as a 
union man. 
4. The A. 8. & R. plant was fully unionized and 
there was a union shop which covered all day-pray 
workers. Even though the employer would be willing to 
emp~oy persons who cross picket lines, union workers 
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would not be willing to work with such employees and 
it would probably be impossible for those workers who 
crossed :the picket line to rem·~in employed at the A. S. & 
R. Garfield plant. 
No reasonable union workman under the following 
set of facts would have crossed the swit~hmen'·s pi~ket 
line and ·entered the A. S. & R. plant on the morning of 
June 28, 1950. Even the 7:)Jant superintendent himsel'f 
stated for the record at the hearing before the Appellate 
Referee tlwJt the plant its·e.lf did not encourage union em-
ployees to cross picket lines. His. exact statement as made 
through his atto1"D.ey was as follows (R. 76) : 
'' * * * I also would like the record to show 
that if Mr. Rouillard were sworn as a witness, 
he would state that it i•sn 't a policy of the Ame·ri-
can Smelting and Refining Company to encourage 
employees to go through the picket lines if it 
involved the A. 'S!. & R. and their employees.'' 
We then have a unanimity of opini:o:n. The employee·s did 
not thlnk it would be in their 'best interest to cross the 
picket line. The company would not ·encourage them to 
cros:s the picket line. 
'The proposition before the Court has not been 
squarely discus1sed by ·any decision that petitinners have 
been able to dis·oo;ver. However, there is one good de-
cision which ·covers all of the hasic propositions which 
petitioners here advance. I1t is Barclay White Co. v. Un-
employment Compensation Board :of Review (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1946), 46 A. 2d 598. In the ·Barclay ease the employee 
refused to :accept ·emiployment at $1.010 per hour, which 
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was a rate of pay whrch was below the wage s~ale esta:b-
lish.ed by his urrron. 1The· basis of his refusal was no't that 
he was unwilling to work for the rate of pay provided 
but tha;t if he did work for that rate he would have been 
suspended from his union with consequent loss ·of all 
membership adVlallJtages including sick, old age and death 
benefits. Compensation was denied by the appeal referee. 
The Board of Appe•als r•eversed the referee and ordered 
the claimant paid. The que•stion before the court Wras 
whether or not claimant had r·efused to accept suitable 
work without good c;ause within the intent of the Pennsyl-
vani·a Unemployment Compensation Law. There was no 
clahn :that the rate of pay was not adequate or the hours 
or other conditions of wO'rk were less favorable to claim-
all!t than those preVJailing in the locality. No condition 
was attached requiring claimant to join a company union 
or to resign from a union ·of which he was a member, and 
claimant was fully qualified to do the work which he was 
referred to. The Board found that if the claimant had 
accepted the proffered employment he would hav.e su'b-
je0ted himself to expulsion from the union of which he 
was a memher and wou'ld have lost accumulated dealth 
benefits. The Pennsylvania court point~d out that the 
power to puni·sh members f·or .activities which the union 
considers detrimental to labor generally was the veri-
table sine qua non of the labor movement, lying very 
near the heart .and of the essen,ce of labo·r's legal struc-
ture. Without ·the ability to punish members for such 
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activity a union would ibe a pallid, impotent ·entity and 
its objectives unrealiZiable. The e:ourt stated the propo-
sition in the foUowing l·anguag;e at page 602: 
·' Thi•s case comes to this: The claimant was 
oblig-ed to decide between the referr·ed employ-
ment and the loss of his union membership. Is an 
unen1ployed workman obliged to accept suitable 
employment when its acceptance subjects him to 
the loss of membership in an organizaJtion which 
is sanctioned and encouraged by the law, and 
there by sacrifice valuable property rights~ I·s an 
employee who refuses referred suitable work in 
such circumstances 'without good cause'~ 
"Unions are now under the protection of the 
police power of the commonwealth, and the legis-
1ature has solemnly declared that 'the public 
policy of the state (is) to encourage the pl"actice 
and procedure of collective bargaining and to pro-
te!Ct the ex;ercise by workers of full freedom 'Of 
association, self-organization, and designation of 
represent1atives of their own choosing, for the 
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions 
of their employment or o1ther mutual ·aid or ip'ro-
tection free from interference, res~traint or coer-
cion of their employers.' * * * It is thus the settled 
policy of 'the state rto encourage unions, to throw 
around them 'the protection of the law, and the 
maintenance of their membership has become a 
matter of direct concern to the public welfare. The 
Law now sustains labor unions not alone because 
of the ine·stimabl·e advantages which they bring to 
their members -bu~t for the larger purpos·e they 
serve, of promoting the public welfare. So, an 
employee who joins a union and abi:des by its 
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internal polity is within his legal ri~hts; and .he 
acquires ·a status for the preservation of whiCh 
the police power of the state is pledged. 
* * * * * 
"* * * W·e have 'the pressure of real, not 
imaginary, substantial, no1t trifling, reasonable, 
not whimiSical circumstances,' and these compel 
claimant's decision to refuse the referred em-
ployment. The threat of expulsion was real, no:t 
imaginary: it w·as contained in the by laws; it 
was communicated 'by a responsible union official 
to the claimant; and other members hrui been sus-
pended or •expell~d for the sam·e cause. It ·was 
•substantial, not trifling: loss of membership in 
the union would deprive claimant of valuable 
property rights, the accumulated death benefits, 
and the opportunity to obtain and retain work at 
union rates. It was reasonable, not whimsical: 
* * ·*. Claimant's refusal contains all the elements 
of good cause.'' 
1The Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Act 
contains a pro·vision !Similar to the Uta:h Worlrmen 's 
Compens•ation Law and states as follows: Section 402 
(b), 43 P.S.: 
''An employee shall be ineligible for compen-
S1ation or waiting period credit for ·any action 
* ·* * (b) in which his unemployment is due to 
voluntarily leaving W01rk without good cause:'' 
The basic decision interpreting the Pennsylvania 
law is Bliley Electric Co. v. Unemployment Compensation 
Board of Review, 158 Pa. Super. 548~ 45 A. 2d 898, 903. 
The court, discussing good cause and involuntary, states 
as follows: 
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''Of course, 'good caus·e' and 'personal rea-
sons' are flexible phrases capable of eon traction 
and expansio~, and by construction, all meaning 
can be compressed out of them or they may be 
expanded to coYer almost any meaning. Reducing 
them to a fixed definite and rigid standard, if 
desirable, is necessarily difficult, if not impos-
sible. However, in whatever context they appear 
they connote as minimum requirements, real 
circum1stances, substan1ti1al reasons, objective con-
ditions, palpable forces that operwte to produce 
correlative results, adequate excus·es: that will 
bear the test of reason, just grounds for action, 
and al·ways the element of good faith. 
"When rel·ated to the context of the statute 
'good cause' takes on the hue of its surroundings, 
and it, and 'personal rea:sons,' must he construed 
in the light reflected by its text and objec:tiv·es. 
The purpose of the act, decLared hy Section 3, 43 
P.S. 752, is to relieve economic ins·ecurity due to 
'involuntary unempJoyment.' Yet selection of i~ 
voluntary unemployed workers is accomplished 
by means of several ·eligibility and disqualifica-
tion provisions, and the provision under review 
provides benefits for employees who voluntarily 
leave employm·ent with good cause. Thus the 
legislature enacte1d, paradoxical as it m.ay seem, 
that ·an employee who voluntarily loo.ves his work 
with good cause is involuntarily unemployed. 
"'Voluntary' and 'involun'tary' are antony-
mous ~and therefore irreconcilable words, but the 
words are merely symho~s of ideas, and the ideas 
can be readily reconciled. Willingness, willfull-
ness, volition, intention reside in 'vo~untary,' but 
the mere fact that a worker wills and intends to 
leave a job does not necessarily and always mean 
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that the leaving is vpluntary. Extra~eous fact?·rs, 
the ·surrounding circumstances, must be taken Into 
the account ·and when 1they are examined it may 
be found that the seemingly voluntary, the ap-
parently intentional, act was in fact involuntary. 
A worker's physical and mental condition, his 
personal and family problems, the authoritative 
demands of legal duties-the~se are circumstances 
that exert pressure upon him and imperiously call 
for decision and ·action. 
''When therefore the pressure of real not 
imaginary, substantial not trifling, reasonable not 
whimsiCJal, circumstances compel the deci·sion to 
leave employment, the decision is voluntary in the 
sense 'that the worker has willed it, 'but involun-
tary because outward pressures have compelled 
it. Or to state it differ·ently, if a worker leaves 
his employment when he is compelled to do so by 
necessitous circumstances ·or because of legal or 
family obligations, his leaving is voluntary with 
·good caus·e, and under 'the act he is entitled to 
benefits. The pressure of necessity, of legal duty, 
or ~amily obligations or other overpowering cir-
cumstances and his capitulation to them trans-
form what is ostensibly voluntary unemployment 
into involuntary unemployment.'' 
We are all famil~ar with the legal principle that an 
O'stensibly voluntary confession may be found to be in 
~act involuntary when the circumstances in which it was 
made are ex·amined. The pressure of promises, threats, 
force, the third degree, etc., form ~the same voluntary act, 
and certamly an intentional ac't, into an involuntary act. 
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Petitioners subn1it that, as •a matter of law under the 
undisputed facts set forth, their failure to cross the 
switchmen's picket line was an ~act which was involuntary 
within the meaning of the Unemployment Compens1ation 
Law of Utah, and there was good c~ause for such deci-
sion. 
POINT II. 
PETITIONERS WERE AT ALL TIMES AVAILABLE FOR 
WORK. 
The findings of the referee that petitioners were 
unavailable for work refers to Section 42-2a-4 (c), Ut:ah 
Code Anno·tated 1943, as amended, Laws of 1949. 'Sub-
section (c) states that to qualify for benefits ,a workman 
must be •able to work and available for work. The referee 
did not find that petitione~s were not able to work but 
only that they were not available for work. Since work-
men's compensation was not intended as a sick or disa-
bility 'benefit •act, those who are unable to work are not 
to receive benef1ts under the Unemployment Compensa-
tion Law. The meaning of the phrase '' av,ailable for 
work" has been discussed at length by Lesser in 55 Y·ale 
L.J. 115, and at 49 Ya,le L. J. 469, as well as the Schindler 
article at 38 Col. L. Rev. 858. 
Whether or not an employee is avail,able usually de-
pends on whether or no:t he is still a part of the labor 
force and will accept suitable employment when offered 
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to him. As has been stated in the facts, at the hearing 
before the Appeals Referee petitioners' evidence was not 
directed 1J1rimarily ~at showing their availability for work. 
Petitioner Kanan struted th'at while he could not 
gain acces·s to the A. S. & R. plant beeause of the switch-
men's picket line, he reported to the office of the Depart-
ment of Employment Security and applied for compensa-
tion; that in addition he made employer contacts seeking 
work at various jobs that he had ther·etofore held, stat-
ing in particular that he went to- the City Fruit Market, 
to the Yellow Cab Company and Artistic Lighting Com-
pany seeking employment (R. 74, 75). Kanan specifically 
stated that he would hav<e been able and available for 
work if any work had been offered him during rthe time 
that he could not ~ain access to his usual place of em-
ployment (R. 76). 
Petitioners Lexes ~and Garner reported back for work 
at the A. '8. & R. ptant ~as soon as the switchmen's ·picket 
line was removed. During the time that the line was up 
they each sought other ·employment, filed daims and 
registered for work. Each stated that had work been of-
fered they would have been available for work (R. 73-76). 
There was no- showing of rany kind that petitioners were 
ever offered employment which was suitable. The find-
ing by the Referee and the Board of Review that peti-
tioners were no:t avaiLable for work from June 28, 1950, 
through July 7, 1950, can only ·be rounded on the f·act that 
petitioners could not cross the switchmen's picket line 
·and enter their usual place of employn1ent. This finding 
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is based on a fur-ther assumption, upon which there is 
no evidencE-, which is that the A. S. & R. plant would have 
been able to operate had only petitioners crossed the 
switchmen's picket line. During all the time that the 
picket line was up the plant was closed. Petitioners did 
not act as a union group, there being no ·evidence of 
orders from their union not to cross the switchmen's 
picket line. In this particular, as far ·as the evidence 
shows, the refusal to cross was based on individual judg-
ment and decision. It was not to the individual welfare 
and best interest of the worker confronted by the picket 
line and the general confused situation at the gate to 
cross the picket line. 
Availability for work in the end must rest on the 
same considera;tions as •discussed in Point I hereof. If 
work could only be obtained at the risk of violence, soci·al 
ostracization or other detrimental soci·al or physical 
dangers, then the work was not, as. a practical matter, 
av;ailable. The men were always available whenever work 
was available. 
A vai1ability was discussed at length in the Bliley 
case, supra, page 16. The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania exhaustively examined their Unemployment Com-
pensation Act and in defining' 'available fo·r work'' they 
arrived ·at the following conclusions, p. 905 : 
''So long as the cl·aimant is ready, willing, 
and able to accept some substantial and suitable 
work he has met rthe statutory requirements. By 
the same token, the ravail'a.bili ty rule does not 
necessarily require that a claimant be available 
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for his most recent work or a custom,ary work. It 
is sufficient if he is able to do some type of work 
and there is r~a;sonab1e opportunity for securing 
such work in the vicinity in whi0h he lives. So, 
an unemployed worker is not justified in refusing 
part time work or temporary work, no'r work for 
which he has not been trained but which he is able 
·to perform. Conversely, a worker who is ready, 
willing, anld able to ~accept part time or tempof1ary 
employment ur employment not in line with his 
prior work or training eannot be classified 'as un-
available. * * * 
''The board's findings of fact reveal a claim-
ant who registered for work, was ready, willing 
and ,able to ac0ept work within the circumstances 
in which she was placed, and had not detached 
her-self from the labor force.'' 
In Dep,artment of Industrial Relations v. Drummond, 
______ Ala. ------, 1 So. 2d 395, 399, the claimant wa;s a mem-
ber of the Oaptive Coal Miners' Union, an affiliate of the 
American Federation of Labor. There was. employed at 
his place of employment miners who were members o.f 
the United Mine Workers of America, 'a C.I.O. affiliate. 
The C.I.O. affiliates at the mine struck and as a conse-
quence all of its employees we-re out ·of work. The' Alabama 
court held that daimant was qualified for unemployment 
workmen's compensation under the Alabama acl. The 
court quoting from Kieckhefer Container Compamy v. 
Unemployment Compensation Commission 125 N.J.L. 
' 52, 13 A. 2d 646, stated as foHorws : 
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'' · The clear meaning of the language is to 
confine tlisqualification ~to those who •are creating 
the dispute or participating therein in order to 
enforce their demands. To accomplish the prose-
cutor's construction would render every employee 
of a business, some of whose employees went on 
strike, ineligible for benefits, nothwithstanding 
his nonparticipation therein and even though he 
might be opposed to the labor dispute and decline 
to have ·any part therein. The use of the words 
'directly interested in the labor dispute' clearly 
limits their application to those ·employees di-
rectly interested in its furtherance by participa-
tion and activity therein. ' " 
It would ap~ar that a party is available for work 
within the meaning of the Unemployment Compensation 
Law where work was available, but he had a good and 
sufficient cause for refusing a referral to such work. 
A discussion of su~h ·a situation is contained in Hag•adJone 
v. Kirkpatrick et al., 66 Idaho 55, 154 P. 2d 181. The 
claimant and appellant in that case wrus sixty years of 
age. He had been employed as a band saw filer at Coeur 
d'Alene, Idaho, earning at such employment $2.020 per 
hour. His employer ceased busine·ss for the season and 
two johs were offered him at Farragut, Idaho, one firing 
a boiler, paying 88 cents •an hour, and one as a common 
laborer, paying 80 cents ·an hour. 'The ap!peUant refused 
both off.ers of employment. He was denied compensa-
tion. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the decision 
and remanded the case for further investigation, stating 
that the Unemployment Compensation L~aw must be 
Irberally cons:trued to the end that its purposes be accom-
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plished. Availability for work requires no more than 
availability for suitable work which the ~laimant has no 
goold cause for refUJsfug. A simi1ar conclusion was 
!'leached by the Colorado Supreme Court in Industrial 
Commission et ·al. v. [Ja.z•ar, 111 Colo. 69, 137 P. 2d 405. 
Petitioners submit tha;t they were :available even for 
their last employment. They remained in the la:bor group 
and av:ailab1e fnr suitable emplo-yment; that their un-
employment was as ·a result of the unavailability of their 
usual work. 
POINT III. 
THE INABILITY OF PETITIONERS TO GAIN ACCESS 
TO THEIR PLACE OF WORK WAS ATTRIBUTABLE TO 
THEIR EMPLOYER. 
The management of the A. S. & R. plant was of the 
opinion that the switchmen's picket line wa;s •a secondary 
boycott and was, therefore, illegal under the laws of the 
State of Utah and could be enjoined. Mr. Rouillard re-
quested that the men wait at the gates of the pl•ant until 
an injunction could ·be ohtained ·(R. 16, 35). 
In their M·emor'andum of Authorities counsel for the 
A. S. & R. cite Section 49-1-10, Ubah Code Annotated 
1943, :as amended Laws of 1947, which defines secondary 
boycott, ·and then cite BectiJovn 49-1-16 (2) (e), Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, as amended Laws of 1947, which state•s 
that a secondary boycott is an unfair labor practice. Mr. 
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Rouillard's request to ~lr. Keith that the men be held 
while an injunction was sought indicates. that the em-
ployer believed it to be its duty to remove from its premi-
ses an illegal picket line. 
From the appearance of the picket line no worker 
could discover whether or not it wa;s an illegal p~cket line. 
Whether or not it was illegal depended on facts which 
no single individual facing the picket line would have 
available. If the picket line was an illegal picket line as 
contended, then it was the du:ty of the employer to re-
move it so that his employees could safely, without fear 
for their social and economic well-being, enter the place 
of their employment. The reasons why the picket line 
was not removed are unknown to these petitioners. They 
had no duty to remove it and while it existed they ~ould 
nOit but assume that it was legal and regular and com-
plied with all the laws of the United States and the State 
of Utah. 
It is submitted that the employer admits that it al-
lowed an illegal picket line to exist at its gates, which 
picket line it knew would prevent its employees from 
gaining access to their place of employment. The in-
ability of the petitioners to reach their place of employ-
ment ·and engage in their usual occupation is attributable 
directly to their employer's failure to remove an obstacle 
over which the petitioners coul!d not pass saf.ely and 
without fear. 
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CONCLUSION 
Petitioners respe~tfully submit that the decision of 
the Board of Review and the Appe'als Referee of the 
Department of Employment Security of the Industrial 
Comm~ssi:on of the State of Utah should be reversed and 
the Court should order that petitioners he allowed their 
unemployment compens1ation for the period commencing 
June ·28th and eniling July 7th, 1950. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK, 
ROBERTS! & BLACK, 
DWIGH'T L. KING, 
Attorneys jar Petitioners 
530 Judge Buililing, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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Received ---------------- copies of the within brief of Peti-
tioners this -------------------------------- day of March, 1951. 
Attorneys fo 1r Defendarnf;.s 
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